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4.1  Introduction 
The academic public finance literature-and  the advice academics offer to 
policymakers-has  been dominated by  a particular approach to tax analysis. 
A well-defined tax base is taken as given, and then the scholar studies the 
effect that taxation of that base has on taxpayer behavior and the distribution 
of income. For example, if we impose a tax on labor income, by how much are 
individuals likely to change hours worked? Changes in hours worked in re- 
sponse to tax distortions generate an efficiency loss that must be traded off 
against any distributional gains from the tax. In order to measure the size of 
the efficiency loss from labor income taxes, past research has focused on mea- 
suring labor supply elasticities. 
There is another type of response, however, that is rarely considered. Rather 
than change work hours in response to taxes, individuals can simply change 
the way in which their pay is reported for tax purposes in order to reduce tax 
liabilities. For example, if the corporate tax rate is lower than the individual’s 
personal tax rate, then a self-employed individual can save on taxes by incorpo- 
rating, retaining his earnings within the corporation where they are taxed at the 
lower corporate rate, and then bequeathing ownership of the corporation to his 
heirs so that his earnings entirely escape personal taxes. During his lifetime, 
his consumption needs can be financed by loans from the corporation, which 
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results in a further reduction in tax liabilities since certain types of  interest 
deductions under the personal tax save more in taxes than are due in corporate 
taxes on this interest income. Similarly, an employee in a firm can be paid 
through qualified stock options rather than through wage payments. Under 
existing tax law, the firm  receives no corporate tax deductions in this case, so 
that the earnings are implicitly taxed at the corporate rate. Personal taxes are 
due only when the shares are ultimately sold, at capital gains rates, and again 
these taxes can be avoided entirely if the shares are bequeathed to one’s heirs. 
This income-shifting response to tax policy has been widely ignored in the 
past literature, yet this response may be at least as important as changes in real 
behavior such as hours worked. In a recent paper (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 
1995), we incorporated income shifting into a model of labor income taxes, to 
see its implications for the design of tax policy. We allowed not only for shift- 
ing of income between the corporate and the personal tax bases, but also for 
income shifting between domestic firms and foreign subsidiaries. The results 
were quite striking. Prior theories of  optimal tax design make strong pre- 
dictions that are inconsistent with most observed tax systems. When we take 
income shifting explicitly into account, many features of existing tax systems 
start to make sense. Our success in rationalizing major puzzles regarding cur- 
rent tax policy suggests that income shifting has had an important influence on 
existing tax policy even if it has been ignored in the academic discussions. 
In this paper, we describe our study of the implications of income shifting 
for tax policy. We  summarize the results of  the prior literature and describe 
how they conflict with actual tax policies. We then discuss the pressures placed 
on a tax system by income shifting between the corporate and the personal tax 
bases’. In contrast to existing theories that predict a zero corporate tax rate, we 
find an important role for a cash-flow corporate tax at the same rate as the labor 
tax. Next we discuss the additional pressures that cross-border income shifting 
between  a  parent  firm  and  a  foreign  subsidiary (through  transfer pricing 
and other mechanisms) imposes on tax systems. With the combined effects of 
domestic and cross-border shifting, we find that we can explain a number of 
otherwise puzzling features of existing tax codes, including most importantly 
the very existence of corporate taxes. 
4.2  The Role of the Corporate Tax in an Open Economy 
A corporate income tax is usually viewed as a supplement to personal taxes 
on capital income. Existing tax systems attempt to tax the return to savings on 
equity grounds. But for a variety of reasons, effective tax rates on capital gains 
are much lower than those on other forms of income from capital. Since much 
of the income from corporate capital takes the form of capital gains, corporate 
capital would be tax favored unless the tax system compensates by imposing a 
separate layer of tax on corporate income. 
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with, how should the tax system treat income earned by foreigners on capital 
invested in the country? One clear finding from the theoretical literature (e.g., 
Gordon 1986; Razin and Sadka 1991) is that a capital income tax should ex- 
empt foreign owners if the country is small enough to be a price taker in world 
capital markets. If the country is a price taker, then any tax on income earned 
by foreign-owned capital in the country will not be borne by foreigners-for- 
eigners will invest in the country only if the net-of-tax return they earn there is 
at least as high as what they can get elsewhere. They would continue to invest 
there in spite of the tax only if the pretax return rises by enough to compensate, 
which  requires that  other corporate deductions (primarily  wage and rental 
payments) fall by enough to offset the effects of the tax. This implies that the 
corporate tax is ultimately borne by domestic workers and landowners. If so, 
even these groups would be better off if  the corporate tax were replaced by 
direct taxes on wage and rental income. With direct taxes on wage and rental 
income, capital investment in the country is no longer discouraged, making the 
country more competitive in world markets. 
Another clear prediction from the prior literature is that, if a country’s resi- 
dents are taxed on their capital income, capital income earned at home and 
abroad should be taxed at the same rate (Razin and Sadka 1991). This gener- 
ally means that foreign-source income should be taxed when it is earned, rather 
than when it is repatriated; deferral until repatriation lowers the effective tax 
rate relative to that on domestic-source income. Further, in order to equate the 
pre-domestic-tax  rates  of  return from investing at home  or abroad, foreign 
taxes paid should be deductible from foreign-source income (Hamada 1966). 
If  income from foreign subsidiaries is effectively exempt from domestic 
taxes, howdver, as suggested by the evidence in Hines and Hubbard 1990, then 
the theory concludes that domestic corporate profits should not be taxed- 
doing so simply drives capital abroad with no compensating benefit. Even if 
income from foreign subsidiaries is in fact taxed at rates comparable to those 
on domestic corporate income, if individual investors can effectively escape 
domestic taxes when they buy financial securities abroad (since the govern- 
ment cannot independently monitor an individual’s foreign-source  income), 
then again the theory argues that domestic profits should not be taxed-such 
taxes simply reduce investment by domestic residents in domestic firms, with 
no compensating benefits. 
These predictions regarding optimal tax policy in an open economy are dia- 
metrically opposed to the actual tax laws we observe in most developed coun- 
tries. Contrary to the theory, most countries have a positive corporate tax rate; 
they tax foreign-owned corporations; they allow their citizens to defer taxation 
of foreign-source income until repatriation; and they allow a credit rather than 
a deduction for foreign taxes paid. Should we conclude that nearly all govern- 
ments have implemented the wrong policies, and consistently maintained those 
wrong policies for many years? Or is the theory missing something important? 
Not only do the existing theories conflict with actual government behavior, 32  Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
but they also predict that firms should behave differently than they do. For 
example, multinationals from high-tax countries face a competitive disadvan- 
tage in low-tax countries: they pay the same low local taxes as do all firms, but 
they also pay  a high surtax to their home government when they  repatriate 
profits. Yet Hines and Rice (1994) show that U.S. multinationals invest heavily 
in countries with the lowest tax rates. 
Given that multinationals do put subsidiaries in low-tax countries, the stan- 
dard theories have a clear prediction about the pattern of pretax profit rates on 
investments in low-tax and high-tax countries. The domestic tax on foreign 
earnings is postponed until repatriation, so multinationals face lower effective 
tax rates in countries with lower statutory rates. This implies that the pretax 
competitive rate of return should be lower in low-tax countries. But Hines and 
Hubbard (1990) and Grubert and Mutti (1987) find that pretax profit rates of 
U.S. subsidiaries are higher in low-tax countries. 
The clear explanation for the above observations is that multinationals are 
able to shift their accounting profits from high-tax to low-tax countries through 
transfer pricing,  loans  between  parent  and  subsidiary, and  other  devices, 
thereby reducing their global tax liabilities. The shifted income explains the 
higher reported profit rate in the low-tax countries. The U.S. government’s re- 
peated efforts to tighten transfer pricing rules and enforcement, in part through 
provisions in the 1986 Tax Reform Act that limit income shifting (particularly 
through interest and R&D allocations), indicate that tax authorities believe 
cross-border income shifting is an important activity. 
Unfortunately, cross-border income shifting alone does not help explain why 
corporate taxes exist. According to the theory, the mobility of physical capital 
alone; along with the difficulties in taxing foreign-source income, should be 
enough to force governments to eliminate taxes on corporate profits. Once we 
recognize that accounting income is also mobile, the tax policies we observe 
make even less sense. Apparently we  need to look yet more closely at what 
taxpayers are doing. 
Our hypothesis is that individuals can easily shift their form of pay  so that 
it is taxed as corporate rather than personal income, just as multinationals can 
easily shift their internal transactions so that income is taxed abroad rather than 
at home. As a result of these income-shifting opportunities, we argue below, a 
corporate tax serves as a backstop to taxes on labor income, thereby enhancing 
the efficiency of  the tax system as a whole. Musgrave (1959) proposed this 
justification for the existence of a corporate tax, but the idea has been largely 
ignored since; as a consequence, a number of recent papers argue that corpo- 
rate taxation should be altogether eliminated. 
4.3  Pressures Created by Domestic Income Shifting 
If domestic individuals can shift income between the corporate and the per- 
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Suppose that the prior theories are accepted, so that there are no taxes on cor- 
porate income because capital is mobile. Then individuals will have a strong 
incentive to find ways  to report their earnings as corporate income. For ex- 
ample, rather than working as an employee earning taxable wages, an individ- 
ual  could  instead become  self-employed, incorporate, and  accrue  income 
within the corporation free of tax. Alternatively, an employee without entrepre- 
neurial acumen might ask his or her employer for pay in stock options rather 
than wages, leading under existing tax law to an increase in corporate and a 
decrease in personal taxable income. 
These forms of income shifting lower tax payments, but at a cost. Changing 
careers from being an employee to being an entrepreneur involves many nontax 
considerations, while receiving pay through stock options has risk and liquidity 
implications. As a result, any differences between corporate and personal tax 
rates not only lead to a loss in tax revenue but also generate efficiency losses. 
In a simple model, we have shown the optimal policy response: a cash-flow 
tax on corporate income at a rate equal to the labor income tax rate.' Under 
such a tax system, individuals can no longer reduce their tax liabilities by 
changing their form of pay,  so would have no tax incentive to pursue costly 
income-shifting strategies. Such a cash-flow tax would also leave investment 
decisions undistorted. 
As forecast, the corporate tax rate in most countries is very similar to the 
top personal tax rate, largely eliminating the gain from shifting income from 
the personal to the corporate tax base. The role of the corporate tax as a back- 
stop for the labor income tax also explains why foreign-owned firms in a coun- 
try should be subject to the same tax rate as domestic-owned firms, contrary 
to prior thedries. If foreign-owned firms faced a lower rate, then domestic en- 
trepreneurs could easily shelter their earnings by finding a foreign investor to 
act as a nominal owner of the firm they set up. 
A similar argument clarifies another puzzling feature of most international 
tax systems: why give a credit for foreign taxes paid on foreign-source income, 
rather than a deduction? First, if foreign-source income were taxed at a lower 
rate than domestic labor income, then domestic entrepreneurs could reduce 
their taxes by using their ideas to open subsidiaries abroad rather than at home. 
By combining this possibility with the previous example in which foreign own- 
ers might acquire domestic firms to shift income out of the domestic labor tax 
base, we can see that subsidiaries would need to be taxed at the maximum of 
the corporate tax rates prevailing in the host and home countries in order to 
prevent either form of income shifting. This is precisely what happens under 
existing crediting schemes. 
A number of complications would modify the conclusion that governments 
1. More specifically,  the corporate tax should be coordinated with any personal taxes on cor- 
porate income so that the net tax rate on corporate cash flow equals the personal labor income 
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should tax corporate cash flow at the labor tax rate in order to avoid wasteful 
income shifting. For example, a major activity of entrepreneurs is to develop 
new ideas. The entrepreneur’s private return can differ substantially from the 
social return, if, for example, others can learn from observing the entrepreneur 
and use his ideas to compete with him. Thus, inducing the socially optimal 
level of entrepreneurial activity might require different tax rates on employees 
and entrepreneurs. 
4.4  Pressures Created by Cross-Border Income Shifting 
As we mentioned above, there is clear evidence that firms use transfer pric- 
ing in order to shift income from high-tax to low-tax locations. What does such 
cross-border shifting imply for the design of a corporate income tax? We  as- 
sume that domestic income shifting is also possible, and thus start with a cor- 
porate cash-flow tax rate equal to the labor tax rate. Now consider the case of 
a high-tax home country, with multinationals that own subsidiaries in low-tax 
host locations. In our model, we assumed that transfer prices were used on 
inputs purchased by  the domestic parent firm from the foreign subsidiary, so 
ignored transfer pricing of output sold abroad by the domestic parent. In this 
case, the firm will use too large an accounting price for these inputs, in order 
to shift taxable income from the high-tax to the low-tax location. The resulting 
income shifting both lowers domestic tax revenues and creates inefficiencies, 
because the firm uses too much of the overpriced input in order to reduce tax 
liabilities and because the effective tax rate on entrepreneurs is now below that 
on employees. 
The home country’s efficient policy response is to lower the tax rate at which 
inputs are deductible, to reduce the incentive to use transfer pricing. We  see 
such a policy response in the income tax rules in the United States, which 
restrict the amount of deductions a parent firm can take for interest, R&D,  and 
overhead expenses against the U.S.-source income. Another implication of our 
model is that the corporate tax rate should be somewhat below the labor in- 
come tax rate, since use of the corporate tax now introduces additional distor- 
tions to those considered previously. In fact, the corporate tax rate in most 
countries is somewhat lower than the top personal tax rate. 
Another policy response to cross-border income shifting is to increase the 
effective corporate tax rate on foreign-source income, lessening the gain to 
firms of shifting income abroad. By making the tax rate on foreign-source in- 
come equal to that on domestic-source income, the home country could elimi- 
nate entirely the incentive to use transfer pricing. Under U.S. tax law, the main 
difference between the tax treatment of domestic and foreign-source income 
is that domestic income is taxed year by year, whereas foreign-source income 
is taxed only at repatriation. One policy response is therefore to tax foreign- 
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Much of the gains from this policy change could be achieved by implement- 
ing it selectively for income earned in jurisdictions deemed to be tax havens. 
While some opportunities for transfer pricing would still exist, the main pres- 
sures would be eliminated. We see just such a policy in the U.S. subpart F rules 
that tax passive foreign-source income when it is earned rather than repatri- 
ated. A further gain from this policy change is that it reduces countries’ gain 
from being tax havens. Even in tax havens, maintaining low corporate tax rates 
undermines their domestic taxes on labor income, and would be attractive only 
if there were enough of a compensating gain through attracting investments by 
foreign multinationals. 
Another policy response to transfer pricing would be to continue to tax 
foreign-source earnings at repatriation but to lessen the gains from deferral of 
tax liabilities on foreign-source income. Deferral of taxes on foreign-source 
earnings is valuable only to the extent that the net-of-local-tax rate of return 
earned on funds kept abroad is higher than the net-of-tax return available on 
funds invested at home. If the two rates of return were the same, then there 
would be no advantage to deferral. If  there were no domestic taxes on the 
return to savings at home, then capital mobility would imply that the net-of- 
tax rate of return abroad could be no higher in equilibrium than that available 
at home, eliminating any gain from deferral. Past theoretical work already sug- 
gests that capital income taxes should not exist in a small open economy; that 
capital income taxes increase incentives for transfer pricing only strengthens 
this conclusion. 
4.5  Closing Remarks 
Capital mobility between open economies creates strong pressure to elimi- 
nate capital income taxes. However, this is not the same thing as eliminating 
corporate income taxes. To  the extent that individuals can shift their form of 
pay so that it would be taxed as corporate income rather than as personal wage 
income, the corporate income tax serves as a backstop to the personal income 
tax. Incentives to shift income between the corporate and the personal tax bases 
would be eliminated through use of a corporate cash-flow tax at the same rate 
as the labor income tax. Cross-border income shifting can be discouraged in a 
variety of ways, such as modifying the tax treatment of  items susceptible to 
transfer pricing. 
We  have not attempted in this study to add anything to the discussion con- 
cerning whether cupituE income taxes should be used in an  open economy. 
What we do argue is that the primary role of the corporate tax appears to be 
as a backstop to the personal tax on labor income rather than as a tax on the 
return to capital invested in the corporate sector. In fact, Gordon and Slemrod 
(1988) found that U.S. corporate taxable income would increase if we shifted 
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suggesting that the normal return to corporate capital is a minor (in fact nega- 
tive) component of  the existing corporate tax  base.2 Our hypothesis in this 
paper, consistent with the Gordon and Slemrod evidence, is that reported cor- 
porate income is primarily labor income left within the firm to escape personal 
tax liabilities. 
Implicitly supporting the important role of income shifting in the design of 
tax policy is the fact that many otherwise puzzling aspects of  corporate tax 
systems around the world appear quite sensible once income shifting is taken 
into account. While it would appear from the nature of government tax policy 
that income shifting must be important, is there any direct evidence on the 
importance of income shifting? 
While there is a growing body  of  work documenting the importance of 
cross-border income shifting within a m~ltinational,~  there has been relatively 
little work attempting to measure the extent of  income shifting between the 
corporate and personal tax bases. In related research  (MacKie-Mason and 
Gordon 1993; Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1994), we report evidence that a 
firm’s decision whether to incorporate is significantly affected by tax consider- 
ations. This says nothing about the extent of income shifting within an existing 
corporation, however. Given the systematic downward trend in personal tax 
rates relative to corporate rates in recent years, if  income shifting were im- 
portant then there should have been a decline in the corporate tax base and an 
increase in the personal tax base in response to this trend in tax rates. In fact, 
a number of  papers have reported such evidence. For example, Poterba and 
Auerbach  (1987) document a decline in the reported pretax  rate of  return 
earned on corporate capital between 1959 to 1985, during which time the dif- 
ference between the top personal marginal tax rate and the top marginal corpo- 
rate rate fell from 40 percent to 4 percent. In addition, Feenberg and Poterba 
(1993) report a sharp jump in the relative income of the richest 0.25 percent of 
U.S. households in the 1980s, during a period when their personal tax rate fell 
substantially relative to the corporate tax rate. Our view is that income shifting 
provides the most plausible explanation for these income trends. 
Given that many  otherwise puzzling aspects of  existing tax policy can be 
rationalized quite easily if  income shifting is important, it would be highly 
valuable in future research to document the extent and the efficiency costs of 
income shifting, in order to judge whether the existing policy response to the 
threat of income shifting is the appropriate one. Since past work has virtually 
ignored the possibility of income shifting, this would involve a major shift in 
research effort. 
2. This study looked at data for only 1983. Subsequent work by Kalambokidis (1992) covering 
1975-87  also found that a cash-flow tax  base would exceed the existing tax base in all years 
except 1975. 
3. See, for example, Harris et al. 1993. 37  Income Shifting and Tax Policy 
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